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Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, 338 participants were asked to communicate in pairs
and then play two games with their partners: the 11-20 money request game (a tool
for assessing level-k reasoning) and a public goods game. The communication oc-
curred prior to any knowledge of what was to follow but played an important role
in allowing them to develop theories or mental models of their partners (“theory
of mind”) which proved to be crucial explanatory factors for decision-making. We
examine the players’ beliefs about the personality and intelligence of their partner,
how they play in the games and analysed the language used during communica-
tion. The results indicate that beliefs about partner’s type is biased by own-type.
In particular, extraverts, characterised by positive affect, projected their positivity
onto their partners. The level-k strategy chosen in the 11-20 game increased with
the perceived similarity between players and in the public goods game, players co-
operated more when they believed their partners to be extraverted. An analysis of
the text used during communication explains how it was possible for participants
to draw inferences about other’s type: for instance, use of more words and more
dominant words were associated with being an extravert.
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“What is consciousness? Our brain simulates reality. So, our everyday experiences
are a form of dreaming, which is to say, they are mental models, simulations, not the
things they appear to be.”
Stephen LaBerge.
“We perceive through our senses a person, a situation or an event, and in an in-
stant, we project our mental models - our fears, background and experiences - onto that
perception. This often results in cognitive errors, which means we judge and respond in-
correctly.”
Elizabeth Thornton.
1 Introduction
Imagine meeting someone for the first time, perhaps a new colleague at work. An initial
conversation might leave a lasting impression, but even if not, most likely you will have
started to form beliefs about the sort of person you have just met. Intelligent or dumb?
Fair or biased? Extrovert or introvert? In thinking this way you have started to build
a mental model of that colleague, one that will develop the more you interact or think
about them and one that you can start to use to predict their behaviour. This process
of mental modelling, of thinking about others’ thoughts and mental states to predict
their intentions and actions is commonly referred to within the psychological sciences
as “Theory of Mind” (Coricelli and Nagel (2009)). The goal of this paper is to analyse
the role played by subjects’ theory of mind while making strategic decisions in outcome
interdependent games.
The paper uses an experimental approach to show how communication prior to strate-
gic interaction (and with no knowledge of the games to follow) leads to the development
of theory of mind (ToM) or mental models of others. These mental models are then used
to judge or infer the intentions or likely behaviour of others. Based on this inference,
players decide their own strategy.
Communication or ‘cheap talk’ before strategic interaction has been observed to affect
behaviour. For example, communication in social dilemmas can increase the frequency
with which people choose joint income-maximising strategies, even when player have con-
flicting interests (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992); Bochet, Page, and Putterman
(2006); Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977); Krupka, Leider, and Jiang (2017)). Com-
munication can increase the play of the efficient equilibrium strategy in coordination games
(Kriss, Blume, and Weber (2016); Blume and Ortmann (2007); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe,
and Ross (1992, 1989)). Communication has also been known to affect behaviour in dic-
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tator games (Andreoni and Rao (2011)), trust games (Charness and Dufwenberg (2006))
and others (Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010)).
A common feature of all these studies is that the nature of the imminent strategic
decision was known to all parties involved before communication. Under such a scenario,
communication before playing outcome-interdependent games can lead to the formation of
non-binding informal agreements. Although, these agreements are non-binding there may
be a cost incurred while breaking them. Several studies have suggested different rationales
for this cost such as social norms (Kessler and Leider (2012)), guilt aversion (Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006)) and lying aversion (Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004)). But what
happens if the nature of the decision to be made is unknown during communication? If
the rules of the game are unknown to the players it is harder to form an informal contract.
In fact not only can we characterize such communication as cheap talk, but since it is hard
for players to know what to talk about we might consider this communication as “small
talk” which contains not only non-binding statements but statements that will not seem
relevant for the decisions to be made. But could these seemingly irrelevant statements
still be indirectly important for decision-making? This paper suggests that communication
will still impact decision-making through the development of mental models that will be
important for the development of beliefs about each other. These beliefs, in turn, impact
decision-making.
1.1 Key Design Features
The study measures ToM using a direct and an indirect approach. The direct approach
involves asking the subjects to take the “Reading the Mind in Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001)). In this test, each subject has to select the
best description of an actor’s mental state from a photograph of their eye region. The
indirect approach involves asking subjects for their beliefs about their opponent’s cogni-
tive and non-cognitive abilities, as well as beliefs about their actions in the experiment.
Beliefs about non-cognitive abilities are elicited by means of beliefs about the partner’s
personality, where as beliefs about cognitive abilities are measured by asking about be-
liefs about partner’s performance in an IQ task. Personality is categorized into 5 traits
or the Big Five personality (John and Srivastava (1999)) traits. Of the Big Five, the
paper focusses on the two fundamental traits, Extraversion and Neuroticism (Costa and
McCrae (1980), Guilford, Zimmerman, and Guilford (1976), Cattell (1973)). Sociability,
enthusiasm, tempo and vigour, observed among high trait extraversion individuals, is
linked with high positive affect. On the other hand, temperamental traits of emotionality,
fearfulness, hostility and impulsivity, associated with trait neuroticism, is related to high
3
negative affect. Both the direct and indirect approaches are incentivized since there are
measurable correct answers.
ToM has two distinct components - a social perceptual component and a social cog-
nitive component (Sabbagh (2004), Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000)). The social-
perceptual component of ToM is the ability to detect the mental states of others, by
using immediately available cues such as facial expressions and bodily movements. The
Eyes Test is a widely used measure of the social perceptual component of ToM. The
social-cognitive component is related to the ability to reason about the content of another
individual’s mental state and use it to predict or explain their behaviour. While the social
cognitive element of ToM is associated with one’s personality and sex, the social percep-
tual component is independent of both (Nettle and Liddle (2008)). Measurement of the
social-cognitive component of ToM generally involves hearing stories or scenarios, and
making correct inferences about what the individuals involved know or believe. Hence,
while the direct measure of ToM used in this experiment measures the social perceptual
component, the indirect measure is more in line with the social cognitive component.
To omit learning effects the experiment is restricted to one-shot games. The design
involves the use of two archetypal and well-understood games: the two-person public
goods game (PGG) and the 11-20 money request game. While the former examines social
preferences, the 11-20 money request game (Arad and Rubinstein (2012)) is a simple two
player game which triggers level-k reasoning. The Public Goods game offers the perfect
setup to analyse how decisions involving social preferences are affected, based on beliefs
formed about others in a social dilemma. For instance, should I help in a communal task
or just attempt to free-ride on the efforts of my partner? The 11-20 game on the other
hand which grants players payment equal to their numerical choice but with a high bonus
if they pick a number one below that of their rival, provides the perfect framework for
examining strategic decisions where people try to out-reason or out-think an opponent: for
instance campaigning decisions by political parties before elections or competitive sports,
or trying to out-think an opponent in a game of chess.
The design allows for interaction between partners before the tasks. Players are allowed
to chat with each other though a chat box on their screens. It is hypothesized that
the language used during interaction between partners is the tool through which players
develop theory of mind. So analysis of the text used by players, during the experiment,
is an important part of our understanding of how theory of mind or beliefs about others
is developed.
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1.2 Preview of the Results
The paper finds that beliefs about a partner’s type are biased by own-type. An extraverted
person, who is subject to positive emotions, fosters a positive social environment (Eaton
and Funder (2003)) and judges neutral events more positively (Uziel (2006)). She is prone
to complementary self projection bias which causes her to project her positivity onto
people she interacts with. This projection of positive emotions also causes her to overlook
the negativity in others. Thus, extraverts find their partners to be more extraverted
and less neurotic. With regards to accuracy of beliefs, a brief chat is sufficient only to
accurately detect the trait extraversion in others. However, the chat is not sufficient to
accurately detect the opponent’s neuroticism or negative affect.
The level chosen in the 11-20 money request game is impacted by perceived similar-
ity, or differences, between the player and their partner’s extraversion. The smaller the
perceived difference, the higher the level-k strategy chosen. This result is consistent with
the perceived similarity hypothesis (Thomas, DeScioli, Sultan Haque, and Pinker (2014)),
which states that people believe, that those similar to themselves will act like them when
faced with a similar situation. Hence, when the perceived difference between the player
and the partner’s personality is small, the player chooses a higher level-k strategy, be-
lieving that the partner will reason similarly and choose a higher level themselves. This
makes it harder for a player to best respond to the distribution of level-k beliefs when the
perceived difference between the player and the partner is small, as it becomes harder to
out-think the opponent.
Cooperation levels in public goods game increase when the partner is believed to
be extraverted. This is in line with the known association of trait extraversion with pro-
social behaviours like cooperation (Graziano and Eisenberg (1997); Graziano (1994)). The
player’s own extraversion on the other hand has a negative effect on cooperation. This is
consistent with an alternative literature (Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, and Hofstee
(2001); McNeil (1995); Mills, Robey, and Smith (1985)) that also finds that introverts,
and not extroverts, cooperate more in an attempt to avoid confrontation owing to non-
cooperative behaviour. Moreover we find that beliefs about partner’s extraversion has a
greater effect on the decision to cooperate relative to own extraversion.
Since communication is the only means that players have to build a theory of mind and
that in turn the opportunity to communicate is the only difference between the control and
treatment sessions in the experiment, it is important to understand how communication
can be having such a powerful effect. Therefore, we provide a direct analysis of the text
used during communication which allows us to shed light on how inferences can be drawn
about partner’s type. Partners who use more number of words, words which evoke more
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arousal and dominance and words which are more humorous are believed to be extraverted.
On the other hand, partners who use fewer words, words with lower valence, arousal and
dominance content, more abstract rather than concrete words and words which are less
humorous are associated with trait neuroticism.
1.3 Summary and Overview
The core novel contributions of this study is the examinable of whether and how different
measures of theory of mind are effective in explaining strategic decision making and to
what extent one’s beliefs about their opponent can be biased by their own characteristics.
While psychometric measures of ToM have recently gained prominence as an explanation
for level-k reasoning, to the best of our knowledge there are no existing papers investigating
the role of theory of mind - as measured via beliefs about opponent’s cognitive and non-
cognitive abilities - in choices reflecting level-k reasoning as well as in social preferences.
Nor is their any work examining how such beliefs are formed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant liter-
ature. Section 3 proposes a simple framework for belief formation and decision-making.
Section 4 details the experiment design used to test the hypotheses formulated by the
authors. Section 5 presents the results obtained from analysing the experimental data.
Section 6 analyses the language used by the players during pre-game communication.
Section 7 concludes.
2 A Short Review of the Relevant Literature
This paper touches on a variety of related work in the study of theory of mind, strategic
sophistication, communication and the relationship between language and personality.
The first branch of literature analyses the impact of theory of mind on strategic deci-
sion making (Fe and Gill (2018); Yoshida, Dolan, and Friston (2008); Coricelli and Nagel
(2009)). Such studies measure theory of mind using existing psychometric tests such as
Imposing Memory Task (Fe and Gill (2018)), Heider-Simmel test (Bruguier, Quartz, and
Bossaerts (2010)) and “Eyes Test” (De Martino, O’Doherty, Ray, Bossaerts, and Camerer
(2013)). This paper, on the other hand, uses a new and indirect approach to measure
theory of mind. This indirect method is concerned with capturing the mental model or
beliefs one forms while interacting with an individual.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on strategic sophistication which finds
that individuals adjust strategies given the information they have about the opponents
(Fe and Gill (2018); Gill and Prowse (2014); Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015)). In
6
the existing literature, people have been known to adjust strategies based on exogenous
information provided, or information learnt through repeated play and feedback. For ex-
ample, Fe and Gill (2018) conduct an experiment where child subjects are told whether
their opponent has above or below median cognitive ability. The authors find that older
children are more likely to adjust behaviour in a level-k reasoning game, based on the
exogenous information provided to them about their opponent’s cognitive ability. This
paper is novel because it examines how individuals adjust their behaviour due to endoge-
nous belief formation about the opponent.
Third, this paper is related to the literature on communication before strategic deci-
sion making, which has focussed on communication with prior knowledge of what’s about
to follow (Krupka, Leider, and Jiang (2017); Bochet, Page, and Putterman (2006); Dawes,
McTavish, and Shaklee (1977)). This paper studies how communication between players,
before a decision making game, can affect behaviour even if the nature of the decision
to be made (or the rules of the game) is unknown to the players, at the time of interac-
tion. The study also adds to the literature on examining the role of personality theory
in strategic decision making. Several studies have highlighted the role of own person-
ality on decision making, especially cooperation decisions (Proto and Rustichini (2014);
Johnson, Rustichini, and MacDonald (2009); Hirsh and Peterson (2009)). This paper’s
novel contribution lies in it’s examination of the role played by beliefs about the partner’s
personality and intelligence in strategic decision making through communication before
the nature of the game to be played is known.
The final strand of literature deals with the relationship between language and per-
sonality. The role of language as a powerful indicator of personality has been suggested
by Pennebaker and King (1999), Furnham (1990), Weintraub (1989), Scherer and Giles
(1979) and Sanford (1942). This study contributes to this field by proposing that lan-
guage used by an individual is the tool through which beliefs are formulated about them
by others.
3 A Simple Framework
3.1 Framework for Belief formation
Let ai be the ability of individual i, either non-cognitive or cognitive, as reported by i
themselves. For non-cognitive abilities, ai is the personality of individual i as reported
by them in the personality questionnaire. It should be noted that, personality, includes
all five traits (Big Five) - Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism
and Openness - into which each individual’s personality is categorized. For cognitive
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abilities, ai is the fluid intelligence of individual i as measured via a cognitive ability test.
Individual i chats with partner j before performing two one shot tasks. Through the
medium of this chat, i forms certain beliefs or predictions about partner j ’s non-cognitive
and cognitive abilities. These beliefs help i infer or predict j’s behaviour during the course
of the experiment.
At the end of the chat, i is asked questions to elicit her beliefs about partner j ’s
personality and IQ. For a rational individual i, her beliefs about the personality or IQ of
partner j, Ei(aj), should depend solely on partner j ’s personality or IQ, as given by j ’s
true abilities aj. So an unbiased belief would be:
Ei(aj) = f(aj) + ei (1)
Where, f() is a general function to show how j ’s abilities affect i ’s beliefs about j, and
ei is an idiosyncratic error term.
This paper, however, proposes that, the beliefs formed by i about partner j, are not
unbiased. The beliefs are, to some extent, biased by i ’s own personality or IQ, ai. Thus,
the beliefs should be given by:
Ei(aj) = f(aj) + gi(ai) + i (2)
Where gi is a function which governs the extent to which predictions are biased by
one’s own personality or IQ. It should be noted that gi is not necessarily equal to gj,
meaning that impact of own personality or IQ on beliefs about the partner, varies across
individuals. Thus, for example, an extravert, will perceive the personality of her partner
differently, compared to an introvert. The underlying idea, here, is that a chat between
partners, shapes i ’s views about j and j ’s views about i, differently. This difference in
perception is explained by individual differences in the players’ characteristics.
Without loss of generality, equation 2 can be re-written as:
Ei(aj) − aj = hi(ai) + errori (3)
where Ei(aj)−aj is the inaccuracy in beliefs formed. This inaccuracy variable measures
the quantity by which players overstate or exaggerate their partners’ personalities or IQ.
The function hi() modulates the extent to which i overstates j ’s personality traits or IQ.
3.2 Framework for Decision-making
Conventionally, decision-making has been associated with an individual’s abilities like
intelligence, individual characteristics like gender, age etc. and preferences such as risk
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preferences and time preferences. More recently within economics, personality theory has
gained prominence in explaining decision-making (Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson, and
Burks (2016); Proto and Rustichini (2014); Johnson, Rustichini, and MacDonald (2009)).
Thus, individual i ’s decision in a task, depends not only on their cognitive abilities but also
their non-cognitive abilities i.e. personality. These cognitive and non-cognitive abilities
are represented by ai. The choice of the individual i, Choicei, will also be affected by
other factors guiding i ’s judgement, such as age, gender, IQ, risk preferences, etc., all
grouped under zi. Thus:
Choicei = λ(ai) + zi + µi (4)
Where, λ() is a function explaining the impact of i ’s non-cognitive and cognitive
abilities on i ’s decision and µi is a white noise error.
This paper takes a step further and proposes that, individual i ’s decision in any task,
is not just explained by i ’s own abilities. The decision also depends on i ’s beliefs about
partner j ’s non-cognitive and cognitive abilities i.e. Ei(aj). So equation 4 is modified as:
Choicei = λ(ai) + γ(Ei(aj)) + zi) + εi (5)
Where, γ() is a function controlling the impact of beliefs about partner j ’s personality
and IQ, on player i ’s decision, and εi is an error term.
Further, as proposed earlier, i ’s beliefs about j ’s abilities is not solely dependent on
j ’s true abilities. i ’s perception about j ’s personality and IQ is also influenced by i ’s own
personality and IQ (equation 2). Therefore, equation 5 can be re-written as:
Choicei = λ(ai) + γ(Ei(aj)[aj, ai]) + zi + εi (6)
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Overview
The experiment was conducted between May and November 2018. Subjects were re-
cruited through the SONA online recruitment system at the University of Warwick. The
participants were undergraduate, postgraduate and staff members at the University. The
experiment was implemented using Z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). In total 338 subjects
took part in the study, with 170 subjects in the control condition and 168 in the Treat-
ment group. There were 17 sessions conducted, 20 subjects per session on average. An
experimental session lasted for approximately 75 minutes. The average earnings from the
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study was £13.20, including a show-up fee of £4. The design was registered with the AEA
social science registry before conducting the experiment.1
4.2 Procedure
At the onset of the experiment each subject was asked to take a personality test, followed
by an incentivised cognitive ability test. For the personality test, the Big Five Inventory or
BFI (John and Srivastava (1999)), was used. and for the cognitive ability test, the Raven
Progressive Matrices test was used2. After the Raven test the subjects were asked their
beliefs about their own performance in the test (this was incentivised as well). Following
this, each subject was randomly allocated to one of two groups. Each subject was then
randomly paired up with a partner from the same group. The two groups were:
1. Control: Players were not allowed to communicate with their partners in this con-
dition. Subjects were asked to take part in a placebo task for 4 minutes (Appendix
B). Then the players were asked their beliefs about their partner’s non-cognitive
and cognitive abilities. Beliefs about non-cognitive abilities or personality traits
were elicited using an 11 item short version of the BFI questionnaire, proposed by
Rammstedt and John (2007). For beliefs related to cognitive abilities, subjects were
asked their beliefs about their partner’s performance in the Raven task.
After answering the questions related to beliefs, subjects were explained the rules of
the first game. They were asked their beliefs about the partner’s strategy followed
by their own decision in the task. After completing the first task they were explained
the rules of the second task or game. Similar to task 1, they were asked their beliefs
about the partner’s strategy and their own decision in the task. The outcome of
both games were announced at the end of the experiment. All questions about
beliefs - beliefs about the partner’s cognitive and non-cognitive abilities and beliefs
about her strategies - were incentivised.
2. Treatment: The procedure in the treatment group was the same as the control
except, instead of the placebo task, subjects were allowed to electronically com-
municate with their partners through a chat box on their screens (Appendix B).
The communication time was limited to 4 minutes. Following communication, the
players were asked to answer the same belief questions as the control group. After
answering the questions, the subjects were explained the rules of the first game and
asked to play the game. The process was repeated with the second task, similar to
the control condition.
1The AEA registry can be found here: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2903
2The raven test is a set of 30 visual puzzles designed to measure one’s cognitive ability.
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Following the two tasks, subjects were asked to take the eyes test (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001)) which is an advanced test of theory of
mind. For this test, subjects were shown 36 photographs of just the eyes of celebrities
and were provided with 4 response options (such as playful, terrified, joking etc.), per
photograph. The participants were asked to pick the option which most closely described
the mental state of the person in the photograph. Then, subjects were asked to answer a
list of 30 questions about their risk attitude. This was the Domain Specific Risk Taking
Scale or DOSPERT (Blais and Weber (2006)) which is a measure of risk aversion. Further,
each subject was asked a series of demographic and other questions such as age, gender,
native language and nationality. Finally, they were be asked to rate their life satisfaction
on a 7 point Likert Scale where 1 was not satisfied at all and 7 was completely satisfied.
4.3 Description of the tasks
1. Public Goods Game: Each subject was allocated 20 Experimental Pounds (EP)
and, along with their partner, were simultaneously asked to choose how much to
contribute (ci) to a joint project. ci could be any integer between 0 and 20. Payoffs
were determined as follows: pii = (20 − ci) + 3/4(ci + cj) where i and j were the
two players. Higher actions while more costly, were more socially beneficial. In the
PGG, the selfish equilibrium is 0 and the mutually cooperative response is 20.
2. 11-20 Money Request Game: Participants were asked to play the basic version of
the game, as proposed by Arad and Rubinstein (2012). Each player was randomly
matched with another player. They were both asked to request an amount of money.
The amount of money had to be (an integer) between 11 and 20 experimental
pounds (EP). Each player received the amount she requested. A player received an
additional amount of 20 EP if she asked for exactly one less than the other player.
In this game, 20 is the salient and level-0 choice, 19 is the level-1 choice as it best
responds to the level-0 strategy and so on. The game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
The order of the two tasks were randomized across sessions. Out of the 170 control
group subjects, 110 subjects played the Public Goods game first, followed by the 11-20
money request game and 60 subjects played it in the reverse order. Out of 168 Treatment
group subjects, 106 played the Public Goods Game first and 62 played the 11-20 money
request game first.
11
4.4 Final Payoff
Final payoff comprised of a show up fee of £4 for the entire experiment. The players also
received payoffs based on performance in one of the two randomly picked tasks or games
(PGG or 11-20). Furthermore, 2 questions out of the 36 questions of the Eyes Test and 2
puzzles of the 30 puzzles of the Raven test were randomly selected. For each correct choice
players were rewarded £1. Lastly, the belief questions were also incentivised. The belief
questions were beliefs about own cognitive ability, beliefs about partner’s personality and
cognitive ability and beliefs about partner’s decisions in the two tasks. For the personality
beliefs, 1 out of 11 questions was randomly picked and if the answer matched that of the
partner, then the subject was awarded £1. For the other 4 belief questions, subject was
awarded £1 for each correct answer. The payoffs of the tasks were in experimental pounds
with the exchange rate as 5 EP = £1. The payoffs ranged between £6.2-20.8.
5 Results
The results are classified into 3 categories - results from belief formation, results from
the 11-20 money request game and results from the public goods game. All regressions
reported were run with standardised variables and the standard errors were clustered at
the pair level.
5.1 Belief Formation
This section discusses what impacts the beliefs the players develop about their partner’s
non-cognitive and cognitive abilities. Table 1 reports the results of an OLS regression
model. The dependent variable is the beliefs reported by the player about the partner’s
personality traits. The beliefs were elicited using the 11-item short version of the BFI as
proposed by Rammstedt and John (2007). The 11-item questionnaire comprises of 2 items
each for the traits extraversion, conscientiousness, openness and neuroticism and 3 items
for trait agreeableness. An average score was computed for each trait and the trait scores
were then standardized (so that each trait distribution had mean 0 and standard deviation
1). The independent variables are the player’s own personality scores, the partner’s true
personality scores, as reported by the partner, and the Treatment dummy which equals
1 if the player was in the chat condition and 0 otherwise. In accordance with the AEA
registry, the paper will only focus on the results for traits extraversion and neuroticism,
the two fundamental personality traits. The regression also controls for the variables
subject’s IQ, score in the Eyes Test, age, gender (a dummy which equals 1 if the subject
was female) and risk aversion.
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show that the player’s beliefs about the partner’s ex-
traversion increases with the player’s own extraversion in the Treatment group. In the
Treatment group, an increase in the player’s extraversion by 1 standard deviation in-
creases the beliefs about partner’s extraversion by .2 standard deviations more, than in
the control group. Partner’s true extraversion also significantly (at 1% level) impacts
beliefs about partner’s extraversion in the treatment group. An increase in 1 standard
deviation in partner’s true extraversion increases player’s beliefs about partner’s extraver-
sion by 0.3-0.4 standard deviations more in the treatment group than the control group.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the effect persists and remains significant even after taking
into account the control variables.
Column 5 of Table 1 shows that the player’s beliefs about the partner’s neuroticism
decreases with the players own extraversion in the Treatment group. In the Treatment
group, an increase in the player’s extraversion by 1 standard deviation decreases the
beliefs about partner’s neuroticism by .2 standard deviations more, than in the control
group. However, columns 6-8 show that this impact falls and becomes insignificant when
the regressions take into account the control variables. Partner’s true neuroticism has
no significant impact on the player’s beliefs about partner’s neuroticism. Thus, an ex-
traverted player believes their partner is more extraverted and less neurotic. Further,
while a partner’s true extraversion can be detected by the player to some extent through
a chat, partner’s true neuroticism is not detected.
Table 2 examines the inaccuracy of the personality beliefs formed. The dependant
variable i.e inaccuracy of personality beliefs is computed by taking the difference between
the player’s beliefs about their partner’s personality and the partner’s true personality
scores. This difference is then standardized. The dependent variable is thus a measure
of overestimation of the partner’s personality by the player (refer to equation 3). The
independent variables are the player’s own personality traits, the treatment dummy and
the player’s eyes test score. The control variables are the player’s IQ, gender, age and
risk aversion and these variables interacted with the treatment dummy.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that the overestimation of partner’s extraversion
increases with the player’s own extraversion in the Treatment group. A 1 standard de-
viation increase in the player’s extraversion increases the overestimation of the partner’s
extraversion by 0.3 standard deviations more in the Treatment group, than in the control
group. The player’s performance in the eyes test has no significant impact on the accu-
racy of beliefs formed by the player. Columns 3 and 4 show that the overestimation of
the partner’s neuroticism decreases with the player’s own extraversion in the Treatment
group. However, the impact is insignificant.
Table 3 presents the results from the beliefs about the partner’s cognitive abilities.
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Column 1 examines the impact of the player’s beliefs about own IQ, partner’s true IQ and
the Treatment dummy, on beliefs about the partner’s IQ. While own IQ belief interacted
with treatment dummy has no significant effect, own IQ belief positively impacts beliefs
about partner’s IQ. Column 2 includes the independant variables the players true IQ
as measured by the Raven test, the players eyes test score and the control variables -
player’s age, gender and risk aversion - as well as the 3 control variables interacted with
the treatment dummy. An increase in own IQ belief by 1 standard deviation increases
the beliefs about partner’s IQ by 0.7 standard deviations for both control and Treatment
groups combined.
Columns 3-6 examine the inaccuracy of the IQ beliefs formed by the player. For
columns 3 and 4 the dependant variable is the standardised difference between the beliefs
about partner’s IQ and the partner’s true IQ (as measured by the partner’s performance in
the Raven test). For columns 5 and 6 the dependant variable is the standardised absolute
difference between the same two values. Hence, for columns 3 and 4 the dependant variable
is a measure of the degree by which the player overestimates their partner’s IQ. On the
other hand, for columns 5 and 6 the dependant variable is how far apart the player’s
beliefs about partner’s IQ is from the partner’s true IQ. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that an
increase in player’s own IQ belief leads to overestimation of the partner’s IQ, irrespective
of being in the treatment or control group. Columns 5 and 6 indicate that an increase
in 1 standard deviation of the player’s own IQ belief leads to a decrease in the difference
between partner’s IQ belief and partner’s true IQ by 0.2-0.3 standard deviations.
To summarise, this subsection finds that extraverted players tend to believe that their
partners are extraverted as well and less neurotic. This effect is significantly stronger in
the Treatment group than in the control group. An extraverted person, who is subject
to positive emotions, fosters a positive social environment (Eaton and Funder (2003))
and judges neutral events more positively (Uziel (2006)). She is prone to complementary
self projection bias which causes her to project her positivity onto people she interacts
with. This projection of positive emotions also causes her to overlook the negativity in
others. Thus, extraverts find their partners to be more extraverted and less neurotic.
This projection is significantly stronger in the Treatment group where the players get to
communicate with the partner.
With regards to beliefs about partner’s cognitive abilities, it was observed that player’s
project beliefs about their own IQ onto beliefs about partner’s IQ, irrespective of whether
they are in the control or Treatment group. Further, it was found that an increase in the
player’s beliefs about own IQ leads to more accurate predictions about partner’s IQ in
the Treatment group than in the control group.
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5.2 11-20 money request game
This section will discuss the results from the 11-20 money request game. Figure 1 shows
the distribution of level-k strategies chosen by the control and treatment groups. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that there is no statistical difference between the level-
k strategy distributions of the 2 groups. Level-2 is the most frequently played strategy in
both conditions.
In accordance with the framework proposed earlier, this section examines if strategy
choice in the 11-20 money request game is affected by the player’s own personality, as
well as, beliefs formed by the player about the partner’s personality. The 11-20 money
request game is a level-k reasoning game. In level-k models (Nagel (1995); Stahl and
Wilson (1995, 1994)) players levels or types are heterogeneous but they are assumed to be
drawn from the same distribution. Peoples’ beliefs are based on naive initial assessment
of others’ likely response called level-0 or L0 and then beliefs are modified via iterated
best response. So level-1 or L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1 and so on. As per Arad and
Rubinstein (2012), this paper assumes that in the 11-20 money request game 20 is the
salient or L0 choice. An L1 player will best respond to their beliefs by choosing one less
i.e. 19 (and hence receiving a bonus of 20), an L2 player will best respond by choosing
18 and so on.
The level-k model suggests that the level chosen by a subject is a measure of her
strategic sophistication or type or more precisely a measure of the player’s beliefs about
the partner’s type (Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015)). This paper examines if the
perceived similarity between player’s own personality or type and the partner’s personality
or type, influence strategy choice. The results are presented in Table 4.
In columns 1-3 of Table 4, the dependent variable is the player’s beliefs about the
level-k strategy chosen by the partner and in columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the
player’s strategy choice. The independent variables are perceived differences between
player’s own personality and the partner’s personality. This is computed by taking the
standardised absolute difference between the player’s own personality trait scores and the
player’s beliefs about the partner’s personality trait scores. Columns 2 and 4 also look
at the impact of the player’s beliefs about partner’s IQ, player’s eyes test score, gender,
order of play of the two tasks (which equals 1 if the 11-20 game was played first and 0
otherwise) and the control variables, player’s age and risk aversion.
Beliefs about partner’s level choice, as well as own level choice, decrease with increase
in perceived difference in trait extraversion, in the Treatment group. An increase in 1
standard deviation in perceived difference in extraversion decreases the player’s beliefs
about partner’s level choice, and player’s own level choice, by 0.5 and 0.6 respectively,
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more in the Treatment group than in the control group. Hence, the smaller the perceived
difference between the two players the greater the beliefs about partner’s level choice and
greater the level chosen by the player.
This result supports the perceived similarity hypothesis which posits that people project
their own thinking and decision-making process to predict how their partners might think
and act when individuals believe their partners to possess attributes similar to their own
(Thomas, DeScioli, Sultan Haque, and Pinker (2014)). Thus, when players believe their
partners to be similar to themselves, they believe their partners will reason more and
choose a higher level-k strategy. This in turn makes them choose a higher level-k strategy
as well.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 examine if there is a differential impact on the dependant
variables, depending on whether the player is highly extraverted or less extraverted. For
this, the regression incorporates interaction effects of the player’s extraversion with a
categorical variable which equals the quartile in which the player’s extraversion score lies.
The results remain similar. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that in the control group order of
the tasks has a negative effect on level belief and level chosen, where as in the treatment
group it has a positive effect. This implies that playing the 11-20 game first increase level
belief and level chosen when the player gets to communicate with the partner, but the
reverse happens when there is no communication.
Being female enhances beliefs about partner’s level, as well as player’s own level chosen,
in both control and treatment conditions. It has been observed (Nettle and Liddle (2008);
Stiller and Dunbar (2007)) that women score higher on the social-cognitive element of
theory of Mind, indicating greater ability to reason about others’ mental states. This
could explain why women choose higher level-k strategies. Futher, an increase in the eyes
test score by 1 standard deviation increases level belief and level chosen by 0.5 and 0.6
respectively more in the treatment, than in the control group. This supports the finding
(Fe and Gill (2018); Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015)) that greater ToM ability is
associated with superior level-k reasoning, though in this study the effect is only observed
when the players get to communicate with their partners. Player’s beliefs about partner’s
IQ has no significant effect on level belief or level chosen in the treatment group.
Next, the paper looks at the distribution of the players’ beliefs about the level-k
strategies chosen by their partners. The distribution is presented in Table 5, along with
the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium distribution for risk-neutral players. The
distributions of beliefs observed in both treatment and control groups are different from
the equilibrium distribution. In both groups, L1 (i.e choosing 19) is the most frequently
believed level. Table 6 calculates the expected payoffs based on the distribution of level-k
beliefs observed. For both control and treatment groups, L2 (i.e choosing 18) has the
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highest associated expected payoffs.
Table 7 uses a probit model to examine the effect of perceived differences in the player’s
and their partner’s personalities on the probability of best responding to the distribution
of level-k beliefs, in the control and treatment groups separately. The dependent variable
is the probability of choosing the best response to the distribution of beliefs which, in this
case, is L2 for both conditions. Column 3 shows that the probability of best responding
significantly (at 1% level) increases by 8 percentage points with a 1 standard deviation
increase in the perceived difference in extraversion, in the Treatment group. The effect is
negative and insignificant in the control group. This implies that the greater the similarity
between the player and their partner, as perceived by the player, lesser are the chances
of the player best responding in the Treatment group.
This result is consistent with Table 4 which supported the perceived similarity hy-
pothesis. When the perceived difference in extraversion is small, the player believes that
their partner will act similar to themselves. This makes it harder to out think or out
reason the opponent, thus reducing the probability of best responding. This result holds
only when the players get to communicate as otherwise the player has nothing to base
their personality beliefs on and thus their beliefs are unlikely to affect decision making.
The results hold even after controlling for the player’s IQ and eyes test score, the player’s
beliefs about partner’s IQ and other controls - player’s age, gender, risk aversion and the
order of tasks. In the control group, increase in the player’s IQ by 1 standard deviation
increases the probability of best responding by 6 percentage points. Table 7 is replicated
using a logit model, showing similar results and presented in Appendix A. Further, the
control and treatment groups are pooled together (using interaction terms) and the results
are replicated using a linear probability model and presented in Appendix A.
To summarise, this subsection shows that it’s the perceived similarity or differences
between the player’s and their partner’s personalities which influence decision making in
level-k reasoning games. In level-k reasoning game’s a player’s strategy is reflective of
the player’s beliefs about the opponent’s type. The player then best responds to these
beliefs, thereby out-reasoning or out-thinking the opponent. Hence, in level-k games, it is
the perceived similarity or differences between the player and their partner’s types which
decide strategy choice. When the player believes the partner’s type is similar to her, it
becomes harder for her to out-reason the partner. This is due to the perceived similarity
hypothesis which states that when a player believes they are faced by a similar opponent,
they believe the opponent will think and act similar to them. This makes the player
believe that the opponent, undergoing the same thinking process, will reason harder and
pick a higher level-k strategy. This makes the player choose a high level-k strategy as
well. Consequently, when the player believes their partner’s type is similar to their own,
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the probability of them best responding to the distribution of level-k beliefs is lower.
5.3 Public Goods Game
This subsection will discuss the results from the Public Goods Game which is a game of
cooperation. The unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the game is to contribute
nothing, where as the joint profit maximisation strategy is to contribute everything. The
average beliefs about partner’s contribution and player’s own contribution are presented in
Figure 2. It was found that the treatment group subjects, on average, believed that their
partner’s will contribute more and the player’s themselves contribute more, compared to
the control group. The average contribution belief in the Treatment group was 13 EP,
where as in the control group it was 10.3 EP. This difference is significantly different
at the 1% significance level with p-value 0.0003 and a t-statistic of -3.640. The average
contribution in the Treatment group was 12.6 EP, where as in the control group it was
9.8 EP. This difference is significantly different at the 1% significance level with p-value
0.0005 and a t-statistic of -3.525.
The regressions reported in this section will only consider the observations in which
the subjects played the public goods game before the level-k reasoning game. The reason
is that, playing the level-k game first, triggers level-k reasoning (Georganas, Healy, and
Weber (2015)), thus biasing decision-making in the social preferences task. On the other
hand, since the level-k game strictly requires level-k reasoning, without invoking any social
preferences (Arad and Rubinstein (2012)), the results of the 11-20 game are not biased
by playing the public goods game first. The results from the public goods game, for those
who played the 11-20 game first are presented in Appendix A.
This paper is interested in examining the impact of own personality and beliefs about
partner’s personality on decision making in the Public Goods Game. Of the personality
traits, this paper is interested in trait extraversion as, of the two fundamental traits, ex-
traversion is associated with pro-social traits (Graziano and Eisenberg (1997), Graziano
(1994)).3 Hence, it is hypothesised that players who believe their partner’s are extraverted,
will believe that their partners will cooperate more and in turn, cooperate more them-
selves. This hypothesis is examined using equation 7. personalityi is player i ’s person-
ality, Ei(personalityj) is player i ’s beliefs about partner j ’s personality, zi are individual
characteristics of i and εi is an idiosyncratic error term.
Choicei = β1personalityi + β2Ei(personalityj) + γzi + εi (7)
3Also, Table A.5, in Appendix A, finds that beliefs about partner’s neuroticism has no significant
effect on decision making in the PGG.
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Ei(personalityj) = λ1personalityj + λ2personalityi + ρzi + i (8)
However, Table 1 showed that player i ’s personality can influence i’s beliefs about
partner j ’s personality in the treatment group. This creates an endogeneity issue and
estimation of equation 7 requires valid instruments. Beliefs about partner’s extraversion
depend on two components - the player’s own extraversion and the partner’s true ex-
traversion, as discussed in section 4.1. These two components are independent, as the
two players are randomly matched. Thus, beliefs about partner’s extraversion can be in-
strumented with the partner’s true extraversion. Equation 8 is the first stage or reduced
form equation. personalityj is the partner j ’s true personality.
The first stage results are presented in Table 8. Partner’s true extraversion significantly
enhances beliefs about partner’s extraversion in the treatment, but not in the control
group. Table 9 presents the results of 2SLS instrumental variable regression. To test for
weak instruments, a Wald test is conducted, which tests the null that the coefficients of the
endogenous regressors are zero. The null, for the treatment group, is rejected at 5% level.
This suggests that weak instruments are not an issue here. Further, the f-statistic in the
first stage regression (for 2SLS) is greater than 10, which indicates that the instruments
are strong (Staiger and Stock (1997)) for the treatment group. Since the endogeniety bias
only exists for the treatment group, equation 8 is estimated without an IV for the control
group as well, and presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 show that, in the treatment group, beliefs about the part-
ner’s extraversion has a significant positive (at the 5% significance level) effect on both
beliefs about partner’s contribution as well as own contribution. However, the player’s
own extraversion score has a negative impact on both. An increase in 1 standard deviation
in extraversion belief, increases beliefs about partner’s contribution and own contribution
by 0.6 and 0.5 standard deviations. On the other hand, an increase in 1 standard de-
viation in own extraversion decreases beliefs about partner’s contribution and player’s
contribution by 0.3 (significant at 5% level) and 0.2 (insignificant) standard deviations
respectively. Thus, beliefs about partner’s extraversion has a positive and relatively larger
effect, compared to own extraversion, on decision-making in the public goods game, in
the treatment group. For the control group, column 2 shows that the player’s extraver-
sion significantly (at 5% level) negatively impacts contribution. Beliefs about partner’s
extraversion has no significant effect on both beliefs about partner’s contribution and own
contribution in the control group.
The result that, an extraverted player is expected to cooperate more in a social sit-
uations, is consistent with the finding in psychology that trait extraversion is associated
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with pro-social behaviour (Carlo, Okun, Knight, and de Guzman (2005), Graziano and
Eisenberg (1997), Burke and Hall (1986)). Thus, the player themselves cooperate, expect-
ing cooperation from their partner. Contrastingly, with regards to the effect of a subject’s
own extraversion on cooperation, the literature is conflicted. While Hirsh and Peterson
(2009); Ross, Rausch, and Canada (2003) and Lu and Argyle (1991) find a positive effect
of extraversion on cooperation, Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, and Hofstee (2001);
McNeil (1995) and Mills, Robey, and Smith (1985) find the opposite. Hirsh and Peterson
(2009) posit that individuals who score high on the enthusiasm aspect of extraversion
cooperate more. Individuals that score high on the enthusiasm facet tend to be more
positive and are more sensitive to rewards (Depue and Collins (1999)). Hence, they view
cooperation as rewarding and owing to their positivity expect others to cooperate as well.
The opposing argument is that introverts, and not extroverts, are likely to cooperate more
as they are more inclined to avoid conflicts. This paper supports the latter argument.
Following Soto and John (2009), this paper divides extraversion of the player into
two facets, assertiveness and activity. This is done to examine which particular facet of
extraversion is responsible for driving cooperation decisions. Assertiveness is an attribute
which helps individuals meet societal demands and thrive amidst people. An assertive
person is one with strong interpersonal communication skills. Activity or enthusiasm, on
the other hand, describes both positive emotions and outgoing friendliness or sociability
(DeYoung, Quilty, and Peterson (2007)).
Table 10 reports the results of the facet analysis. Columns 1 and 2 report the OLS
regression results for the control group and columns 3 and 4 report the IV regression
results. Column 2 shows that the players own assertiveness has a negative significant
(5% level) effect on contribution levels where as facet activity has an insignificant positive
effect. An increase in 1 standard deviation in the player’s assertiveness score reduces
their contribution level by .2 standard deviations. None of the facets significantly impact
beliefs about partner’s contribution. The IV regression results reflect the same results.
For the treatment group, columns 5 and 6 show that beliefs about partner’s extraver-
sion positively (significant at the 5% level) effect beliefs about partner’s contribution as
well as own contribution. With regards to the player’s own personality, facet assertiveness
has a significant (5% level) negative effect on both contribution belief and own contribu-
tion, where as facet activity has an insignificant positive effect.
To summarise the findings of this subsection, when a player believes that their part-
ner is extraverted, they believe that their partner’s will cooperate more. This is because
trait extraversion is associated with pro-social behaviours like cooperation. This in turn
encourages the players to cooperate more themselves. Contrastingly, a player’s own ex-
traversion has a negative effect on beliefs about partner’s cooperation, as well as own
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cooperation. This negative effect of extraversion is driven by the assertive facet of an ex-
travert’s personality. Lastly, beliefs about partner’s extraversion have a relatively larger
effect on decision making in the public goods game than own extraversion.
6 Text Analysis
In this paper, players form beliefs about each other after communicating through a chat
box on their computers. Language or words used by an individual can be reflective of their
personalities and social behaviour. In social interaction games, communication between
partners is the medium through which they build theory of mind or mental models of
each other. Individuals form beliefs about the likely behaviour of their partners and
formulate strategies accordingly. Figure 3 represents the most frequently spoken words
by the subjects during the pre-game communication, depicting a very general and trivial
nature of chat. Figures 4 a-d attempt to distinguish between the most frequently used
words by subjects believed to have different personalities. Through a simple look at
word usage, it’s hard to distinguish between the nature of language used by subjects
believed to have different personalities. Those who are believed to be highly extraverted
(believed to have above median extraversion scores) have similar most frequently words as
those who are believed to be less extraverted (believed to have below median extraversion
scores). Figures 4 c and d indicate the same for neuroticism beliefs. This is expected as
subjects communicate via an unstructured chat. This section, however, conducts a deeper
examination of the different characteristics of language used by players, to explain why
players develop specific beliefs about each other.
The first thing that is examined is, if beliefs about any personality trait is associated
with the total number of words spoken. Table 11 reports the results. Column 1 shows
that beliefs about partner’s extraversion increase with the number of words spoken by
the partner. Extraversion is characterized by attributes like sociability, gregariousness,
enthusiasm and overall positive affect. Hence, those who speak more, appear more social,
and are believed to be extraverted. Column 2 shows that the result persists even after
controlling for the player’s IQ, eyes test score, age, gender, beliefs about partner’s IQ and a
dummy for non-native speaker which equals 1 if the player is a non-native English speaker
and 0 otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 show that beliefs about partner’s neuroticism decrease
with the number of words spoken by the partner, although the impact is insignificant.
Age has a significant positive (at 5% level) and a significant negative (at 5% level) effect
on beliefs about partner’s extraversion and neuroticism respectively. This implies that
younger people are more likely to believe that their partner’s are more extraverted and
less neurotic. It should be noted that the average age of the subjects in this dataset is 21
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with a standard deviation of 3.62.
Furthermore, the scores for three affective or emotional components of the partner’s
language use, namely, valence, arousal and dominance, are calculated, using the ratings
proposed by Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013). Valence refers to the pleas-
antness of a stimulus, arousal is the intensity of emotion provoked by a stimulus, and
dominance is the degree of control exerted by a stimulus. Table 12 shows that beliefs
about partner’s neuroticism decrease with valence rating of the partner’s speech. Valence
rating of a word refers to the pleasant emotion conveyed by a word, with the rating in-
creasing as it moves from unhappy to happy. Since, trait neuroticism is associated with
negative emotions, beliefs about partner’s neuroticism decrease with the pleasantness of
the words used by them.
Table 13 shows that beliefs about partner’s extraversion increase and beliefs about
neuroticism decrease with the arousal rating of the text used by the partner. Arousal
rating of a word is the degree of arousal evoked by it, with value increasing from calm
to excited. An increase in the degree of excitement conveyed by words used by the part-
ner, increases beliefs about partner’s extraversion and decreases beliefs about partner’s
neuroticism. Lastly, Table 14 shows that beliefs about partner’s extraversion increase
and beliefs about neuroticism decrease with the dominance rating of the text used by
the partner. The dominance rating of a word increases when the degree to which it con-
veys the emotion of being in control increases. Extraversion is associated with leadership
and social dominance (Watson and Clark (1992)), while neuroticism is associated with
insecurity and self-consciousness (Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, and Barrick (1999)). Thus,
those believed to convey the message of being in control, or being dominant, trough their
text, are believed to be more extraverted and less neurotic by their partners. It should
be noted that the relationship between beliefs about partner’s personality and the three
affective components of partner’s language use hold even after controlling for the number
of words spoken by the partner and the player’s individual characteristics.
Next, the paper examines if beliefs about partner’s personality are related with con-
creteness rating of the partner’s speech. Concreteness refers to a word’s ability to make
specific and definite reference to particular objects (Hills, Adelman, and Noguchi (2016)).
The total concreteness score of the language used by the partner is calculated using the list
of concreteness ratings proposed by Brysbaert, Warriner, and Kuperman (2014). Com-
pared to abstract words, concrete words are easier to learn (De Groot and Keijzer (2000)),
recall, recognize (Paivio (1990)), comprehend (Sadoski (2001); Moeser (1974)) and pro-
nounce (De Groot (1989)). Table 15 shows that an increase in the concreteness rating of
the partner’s speech increase beliefs about partner’s extraversion (insignificant effect) and
decreases beliefs about partner’s neuroticism (significant at 5% level). This shows that
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players associate the use of concrete words with trait extraversion and abstract words
with trait neuroticism.
The paper also examined the effect of the use of humour by a subject on beliefs
formed about their personality. This was accomplished by calculating humour ratings of
the text used by each subject, using the humour ratings proposed by Engelthaler and
Hills (2018). Table 16 shows that an increase in 1 standard deviation in the humour
rating of the language used by the partner increases beliefs about their extraversion by
0.15 standard deviations (significant at 1%) and decreases beliefs about their neuroticism
by .1 standard deviations. That is, humour is associated with the presence of positive
emotions or extraversion and the absence of negative emotions or neuroticism. This is
consistent with literature (Cann and Collette (2014); Martin, Kuiper, Olinger, and Dance
(1993)) which finds that higher levels of humour is associated with greater positive affect.
Lastly, the Age of Acquisition ratings, for the language used by the partner, was calcu-
lated, using the age of acquisition ratings proposed by Kuperman, Stadthagen-Gonzalez,
and Brysbaert (2012). Age of acquisition (AoA) of a word is the age at which the word
is learnt. Words learnt earlier in life are easier to recall than words learnt later (Izura,
Pe´rez, Agallou, Wright, Mar´ın, Stadthagen-Gonza´lez, and Ellis (2011), Monaghan and El-
lis (2010)) as their meaning is more accessible (Sailor, Zimmerman, and Sanders (2011),
Brysbaert, Van Wijnendaele, and De Deyne (2000)). Partners who use more words which
are easier to recall are believed to be more extraverted and less neurotic (Table 17).
To summarise the findings of this section, partners who use more number of words
and words which evoke more arousal and dominance are believed to be extraverted. On
the other hand, partners who use fewer words, words with lower valence, arousal and
dominance content and more abstract rather than concrete words are associated with
trait neuroticism.
7 Concluding Remarks
There is a small literature in Economics which addresses the role of theory of mind (ToM)
in explaining strategic decision making. Most of this literature has treated ToM as a cog-
nitive skill and measured it using psychometric tests. This paper makes a novel attempt
to evaluate a person’s ToM, not just as a cognitive skill, but as the set of beliefs one
develops about others during interactions. The paper shows that these beliefs, whether
accurate or not, influence choices in interactive decision making scenarios. This research
is important as it could go a long way in explaining economic, social and political choices
that people make, where the outcome of the choice depends on how other people behave.
This paper examines the impact of theory of mind on decision making in two one-shot
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games. The first game is the 11-20 money request game which is a pure level-k reasoning
game and resembles real world scenarios where payoffs depend on having to outwit oth-
ers, such as competitive sports or partisan politics. The second game is a Public Goods
Game which is a game of cooperation and resembles real world scenarios involving social
dilemmas such as deciding whether to cooperate to combat climate change, knowing that
the outcome will depend on collective action.
The paper finds that people tend to project their own characteristics on others. Ex-
traverts, who are characterised by their positive emotions, suffer from self projection bias.
They project their extraversion or positive emotions onto their partners and overlook the
partners’ negativity or neuroticism. Further, the level-k strategy chosen in the 11-20 game
is impacted by perceived similarity between player and their partner’s extraversion. The
smaller the perceived difference, the higher the level-k strategy chosen. This result fol-
lows from the perceived similarity hypothesis which states that people expect like-minded
people to act similar, when faced with the same situation. Hence, when a player believes
that their opponent is similar to them, the player reasons more and chooses a higher
level, expecting the opponent to reason more as well. Also, believing that their partner is
similar to them, reduces the probability of the player best-responding to the distribution
of beliefs.
In the Public Goods Game it was found that when players believe their partners to
be extraverted, they expect the partner to cooperate. This is due to the association of
trait extraversion with pro-social behaviours like cooperation. This in turn, enhances the
player’s own cooperation. While beliefs about partner’s extraversion encourage coopera-
tion, the player’s own extraversion has a negative impact on cooperation. This is because
introverts, and not extroverts, cooperate more in an attempt to avoid confrontation from
non-cooperation.
Pre-play communication occurred before players knew they would be playing games
together. Nevertheless communication was vital as the only way in which players could
build a theory of mind. It was therefore important that the communication could be used
to derive information about the personality and intelligence of their partners. Analysis of
the language used by players during the pre-game communication revealed that players
were indeed drawing inferences from the words used by their partners. Partners who use
a higher number of words, words which evoke more arousal and dominance and words
which are more humorous, are believed to be extraverted. On the other hand, partners
who use fewer words, words with lower valence, arousal and dominance content, more
abstract rather than concrete words and words which are less humorous are believed to
be neurotic.
Taking a step back from the detail of the results, perhaps the most general message
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that derives from our findings concerns the importance of communication in settings where
it might seem irrelevant. To make this clear, it might be worth considering a hypothetical
situation. Think of someone you know and now consider a strategic setting that you have
never discussed or played with that person before (so there is not even scope for cheap
talk). Do you think you are better placed to predict how that person would behave in
that strategic context than a stranger? If so then this is consistent with our key result:
communication need not be about strategic interaction in order for it be important for
strategic interaction. Communication about even the most trivial things (“small talk”)
can help people to learn about each other which in turn helps them to predict how others
are likely to behave in strategic situations. Our paper has shown that this is indeed the
case and how this might come about in two quite different settings.
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8 Tables and Figures
8.1 Tables
Table 1: Impact of own personality on beliefs about partner’s personality
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OwnExtraversion × Treatment 0.2342∗∗ 0.2134∗ 0.2151∗ 0.2955∗∗ -0.1949∗∗ -0.1117 -0.1255 -0.0581
(0.091) (0.117) (0.119) (0.125) (0.092) (0.118) (0.131) (0.123)
OwnNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1406 0.1481 0.1512 0.1527 -0.0008 -0.0475 -0.0423 -0.0450
(0.091) (0.124) (0.124) (0.131) (0.074) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111)
PartnerExtraversion × Treatment 0.2820∗∗∗ 0.4097∗∗∗ 0.4010∗∗∗ 0.4188∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110)
PartnerNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1148 0.0272 -0.0005 0.0195
(0.075) (0.104) (0.103) (0.101)
Own Extraversion 0.0208 0.0606 0.0247 -0.0832 -0.0726 -0.0890
(0.073) (0.079) (0.080) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074)
Own Neuroticism -0.0075 0.0078 0.0008 0.0468 0.0607 0.0705
(0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.084) (0.081) (0.082)
Partner’s Extraversion -0.1277∗ -0.1242∗ -0.1336∗
(0.070) (0.074) (0.075)
Partner’s Neuroticism 0.0876 0.1081 0.0960
(0.072) (0.071) (0.070)
Treatment 0.3768∗∗∗ 0.3768∗∗∗ 0.3490∗∗∗ -0.2838 -0.5214∗∗∗ -0.5214∗∗∗ -0.1973 -0.5138∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.098) (0.100) (0.631) (0.104) (0.104) (0.558) (0.103)
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Controls × Treatment No No No Yes No No Yes No
N 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: Inaccuracy of personality beliefs
Inaccuracy of
Extraversion Belief
Inaccuracy of
Neuroticism Belief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OwnExtraversion × Treatment 0.2509∗ 0.3035∗∗ -0.0676 -0.0692
(0.136) (0.143) (0.116) (0.118)
OwnNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1665 0.1916 -0.0943 -0.0809
(0.116) (0.128) (0.121) (0.127)
Own Extraversion -0.0636 -0.0335 -0.0891 -0.0666
(0.112) (0.116) (0.076) (0.070)
Own Neuroticism -0.0711 -0.0813 0.0846 0.0864
(0.082) (0.093) (0.085) (0.087)
Treatment 0.3437∗∗∗ -0.0418 -0.3523∗∗∗ -0.1057
(0.104) (0.676) (0.108) (0.636)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.0482 0.0890 0.0892 0.1462
(0.093) (0.094) (0.126) (0.131)
Eyes Test Score -0.0111 -0.0459 -0.1109 -0.1761∗∗
(0.070) (0.074) (0.080) (0.086)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Impact of beliefs about own cognitive ability on beliefs about partner’s cognitive
ability
IQ
Belief
Inaccuracy of
IQ Belief
Inaccuracy of
IQ Belief
(absolute values)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own IQ Belief × Treatment -0.0586 -0.0624 0.0136 0.0181 -0.2038∗ -0.3135∗∗
(0.086) (0.116) (0.095) (0.122) (0.112) (0.143)
Partner’s IQ × Treatment -0.0345 -0.0186
(0.081) (0.082)
Own IQ belief 0.6686∗∗∗ 0.7297∗∗∗ 0.4902∗∗∗ 0.5443∗∗∗ -0.0848 0.0204
(0.060) (0.078) (0.062) (0.081) (0.078) (0.106)
Partner’s IQ 0.0937∗ 0.0895∗
(0.050) (0.050)
Treatment -0.0866 0.4422 -0.1811∗ 0.2953 0.0656 0.4072
(0.083) (0.514) (0.096) (0.567) (0.110) (0.621)
Own IQ × Treatment -0.0172 -0.0036 0.1465
(0.110) (0.132) (0.121)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.0279 0.0908 0.0977 0.1729 0.1705
(0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.124) (0.126)
Own IQ -0.0714 -0.0783 -0.1223
(0.069) (0.092) (0.087)
Eyes Test Score 0.0196 -0.0258 -0.0228 -0.1709∗∗ -0.1915∗∗
(0.078) (0.073) (0.068) (0.086) (0.085)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and predicted on level-k
strategy chosen
Level
Belief
Level
Chosen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiffExtraversion × Treatment -0.5241∗ -0.4891∗ -0.3765 -0.6521∗∗∗ -0.5991∗∗ -0.4846∗
(0.266) (0.286) (0.311) (0.234) (0.251) (0.280)
DiffNeuroticism × Treatment 0.1920 0.2798 0.2936 -0.0424 0.0810 0.0718
(0.254) (0.278) (0.286) (0.254) (0.274) (0.276)
Treatment 0.1704 -2.7390 -2.1611 0.0705 -2.0793 -1.4173
(0.267) (2.047) (2.125) (0.278) (1.831) (1.871)
DiffExtraversion 0.1453 0.0989 0.1128 0.2022 0.1342 0.0330
(0.196) (0.194) (0.205) (0.175) (0.174) (0.190)
DiffNeuroticism -0.1614 -0.2511 -0.2677 -0.1640 -0.3098∗ -0.2928
(0.187) (0.203) (0.209) (0.178) (0.182) (0.186)
Own Extraversion × Treatment 0.1219 0.7077 0.1887 0.8699
(0.324) (0.644) (0.295) (0.652)
Own Extraversion -0.1171 -0.0887 -0.2809 -0.6816
(0.181) (0.405) (0.197) (0.421)
OwnExtraversion × Q2 × Treatment -0.6707 0.5285
(1.910) (1.801)
OwnExtraversion × Q3 × Treatment -1.4108 -2.3728
(2.397) (2.267)
OwnExtraversion × Q4 × Treatment -1.2594 -1.4958
(1.152) (1.144)
Own IQ × Treatment -0.2390 -0.2145 -0.2463 -0.2214
(0.286) (0.291) (0.297) (0.304)
IQ Belief × Treatment 0.3313 0.3063 0.1904 0.2104
(0.305) (0.306) (0.261) (0.264)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment 0.4923∗ 0.4997 0.5358∗ 0.5383∗
(0.294) (0.303) (0.302) (0.307)
Female × Treatment -0.7721 -0.7485 -0.9905∗ -0.9761∗
(0.594) (0.606) (0.546) (0.561)
Order × Treatment 1.1342∗∗ 1.1671∗∗ 1.0958∗ 1.1291∗
(0.572) (0.581) (0.584) (0.589)
Own IQ 0.1853 0.1610 0.2278 0.1672
(0.199) (0.206) (0.207) (0.217)
IQ Belief -0.3371∗ -0.3416∗ -0.3130 -0.3238
(0.200) (0.201) (0.190) (0.197)
Eyes Test Score -0.4134∗ -0.3986 -0.4390∗ -0.4334∗
(0.242) (0.247) (0.243) (0.245)
Female 1.0815∗∗∗ 1.0931∗∗∗ 1.4610∗∗∗ 1.4770∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.414) (0.364) (0.375)
Order -0.7868∗∗ -0.8241∗∗ -1.0018∗∗ -1.0161∗∗
(0.390) (0.399) (0.408) (0.411)
Extraversion × Extraversion quartile No No Yes No No Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 338 338 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 29
Table 5: Distribution of Level-k beliefs
Level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Equilibrium (%) 5 10 15 20 25 25
Treatment (%) 12.50 32.14 17.26 5.95 4.17 11.31 4.17 2.38 3.57 6.55
Control (%) 17.06 25.88 18.82 5.29 7.06 10.00 7.06 3.53 1.76 3.53
Table 6: Expected Payoffs
Level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Treatment (EP) 20.00 21.50 24.43 20.45 17.19 15.83 16.26 13.83 12.48 11.71
Control (EP) 20.00 22.41 23.18 20.76 17.06 16.41 16.00 14.41 12.71 11.35
Table 7: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and predicted on the
probability of choosing the best response - Probit Model
Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2)
DiffExtraversion -0.0448 -0.0499 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029)
DiffNeuroticism -0.0008 -0.0138 -0.0469 -0.0461
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Own IQ 0.0612∗ 0.0551
(0.036) (0.036)
IQ Belief -0.0438 -0.0053
(0.029) (0.036)
Eyes Test Score 0.0474 0.0419
(0.038) (0.032)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 170 170 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: First Stage
Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Own Extraversion 0.0298 0.0332 0.2141∗∗ 0.2607∗∗
(0.086) (0.102) (0.106) (0.103)
Partner’s Extraversion -0.1013 -0.0975 0.3532∗∗∗ 0.3638∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094)
Own IQ -0.1016 0.0119
(0.101) (0.100)
IQ Belief -0.0549 0.0163
(0.144) (0.093)
Eyes Test Score -0.0466 0.1186
(0.106) (0.073)
Control No Yes No Yes
N 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality on beliefs
about partner’s contribution and own contribution in Public Goods Game
Control
OLS
Control
IV
Treatment
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
ExtraversionBelief 0.0617 0.1140 -0.4136 -0.9698 0.6251∗∗ 0.5325∗∗
(0.084) (0.095) (1.043) (1.353) (0.271) (0.269)
OwnExtraversion -0.0751 -0.2091∗∗ -0.0605 -0.1759 -0.3147∗∗ -0.2067
(0.097) (0.090) (0.126) (0.178) (0.137) (0.141)
Own IQ -0.0588 -0.0421 -0.1052 -0.1478 0.0864 0.1564
(0.097) (0.085) (0.162) (0.216) (0.094) (0.104)
IQ Belief 0.1261 0.1151 0.0977 0.0504 0.0879 0.2425∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.100) (0.135) (0.201) (0.086) (0.089)
Eyes Test Score -0.0439 -0.0015 -0.0619 -0.0426 0.1062 0.1531
(0.097) (0.121) (0.093) (0.186) (0.119) (0.142)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110 110 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality facets on
beliefs about partner’s contribution and own contribution in Public Goods Game
Control
OLS
Control
IV
Treatment
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
ExtraversionBelief 0.0557 0.1064 -0.3217 -0.8384 0.6331∗∗ 0.5404∗∗
(0.081) (0.091) (0.911) (1.128) (0.272) (0.258)
OwnAssertiveness -0.1287 -0.2326∗∗ -0.1459 -0.2756∗ -0.3364∗∗ -0.3170∗∗
(0.109) (0.111) (0.120) (0.142) (0.131) (0.127)
OwnActivity 0.0598 0.0336 0.0978 0.1289 0.0257 0.1575
(0.116) (0.118) (0.171) (0.213) (0.125) (0.107)
Own IQ -0.0501 -0.0326 -0.0822 -0.1129 0.0788 0.1409
(0.095) (0.084) (0.144) (0.183) (0.099) (0.106)
IQ Belief 0.1403 0.1313 0.1234 0.0891 0.1050 0.2734∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.098) (0.118) (0.183) (0.092) (0.093)
Eyes Test Score -0.0349 0.0116 -0.0455 -0.0150 0.1215 0.1784
(0.099) (0.118) (0.096) (0.168) (0.120) (0.142)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110 110 110 110 106 106
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Impact of number of words spoken by the partner on beliefs about partner’s
personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Number of Words 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Own IQ -0.0745 0.0827
(0.086) (0.077)
Eyes Test Score 0.0644 0.0326
(0.060) (0.097)
Age 0.0269 -0.0380∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.0819 -0.2122
(0.158) (0.155)
IQ Belief 0.0980 -0.0591
(0.082) (0.083)
Native Speaker 0.3460∗∗ -0.2253
(0.151) (0.164)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Impact of Valence rating of the text used by the partner on beliefs about
partner’s personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Valence 0.1029 0.0849 -0.0932∗∗ -0.1070∗∗
(0.074) (0.066) (0.037) (0.048)
Number of Words 0.0082∗∗∗ -0.0013
(0.003) (0.002)
Own IQ -0.0865 0.0979
(0.088) (0.078)
Eyes Test Score 0.0726 0.0223
(0.060) (0.098)
Age 0.0266 -0.0377∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.0848 -0.2085
(0.160) (0.155)
IQ Belief 0.1134 -0.0785
(0.082) (0.086)
Native Speaker 0.3559∗∗ -0.2378
(0.149) (0.161)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Impact of Arousal rating of the text used by the partner on beliefs about
partner’s personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Arousal 0.1579∗∗ 0.1529∗∗∗ -0.1016∗∗∗ -0.1284∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.052) (0.037) (0.044)
Number of Words 0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0012
(0.003) (0.003)
Own IQ -0.1113 0.1136
(0.086) (0.079)
Eyes Test Score 0.0673 0.0302
(0.058) (0.097)
Age 0.0239 -0.0355∗
(0.021) (0.020)
Female -0.0879 -0.2071
(0.158) (0.154)
IQ Belief 0.1346∗ -0.0898
(0.080) (0.085)
Native Speaker 0.3751∗∗ -0.2497
(0.149) (0.162)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Impact of Dominance rating of the text used by the partner on beliefs about
partner’s personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Dominance 0.1177∗∗ 0.1051∗∗ -0.0881∗∗∗ -0.1095∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.051) (0.029) (0.039)
Number of Words 0.0082∗∗∗ -0.0014
(0.003) (0.002)
Own IQ -0.0908 0.0997
(0.088) (0.077)
Eyes Test Score 0.0743 0.0224
(0.060) (0.098)
Age 0.0265 -0.0377∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.0725 -0.2220
(0.161) (0.154)
IQ Belief 0.1153 -0.0772
(0.082) (0.086)
Native Speaker 0.3587∗∗ -0.2385
(0.148) (0.161)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Impact of Concreteness rating of the text spoken by the partner on beliefs
about partner’s personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Concreteness 0.1090 0.0751 -0.1400∗∗∗ -0.1290∗∗
(0.077) (0.070) (0.052) (0.059)
Number of Words 0.0084∗∗∗ -0.0014
(0.003) (0.002)
Own IQ -0.0853 0.1013
(0.088) (0.079)
Eyes Test Score 0.0672 0.0277
(0.060) (0.095)
Age 0.0266 -0.0375∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Female -0.0949 -0.1899
(0.158) (0.153)
IQ Belief 0.1117 -0.0826
(0.081) (0.089)
Native Speaker 0.3252∗∗ -0.1896
(0.149) (0.169)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
37
Table 16: Impact of Humour rating of the text used by the partner on beliefs about
partner’s personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Humour 0.1642∗∗∗ 0.1521∗∗∗ -0.0789∗∗ -0.1039∗∗
(0.047) (0.043) (0.036) (0.041)
Number of Words 0.0077∗∗∗
(0.003)
Own IQ -0.1065 0.1054
(0.089) (0.078)
Eyes Test Score 0.0745 0.0209
(0.059) (0.096)
Age 0.0259 -0.0382∗
(0.020) (0.019)
Female -0.0935 -0.1953
(0.158) (0.152)
IQ Belief 0.1286 -0.0812
(0.081) (0.086)
Native Speaker 0.3602∗∗ -0.2335
(0.146) (0.162)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Impact of Age of Acquisition rating of the text used by the partner on beliefs
about partner’s personality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extraversion
Belief
Extraversion
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Neuroticism
Belief
Age of Acquisition 0.2104∗∗∗ 0.1715∗∗∗ -0.0952∗∗∗ -0.1079∗∗
(0.041) (0.048) (0.035) (0.047)
Number of Words 0.0074∗∗ -0.0012
(0.003) (0.003)
Own IQ -0.0954 0.0958
(0.087) (0.076)
Eyes Test Score 0.0733 0.0270
(0.058) (0.097)
Age 0.0239 -0.0362∗
(0.021) (0.020)
Female -0.0574 -0.2276
(0.158) (0.155)
IQ Belief 0.1083 -0.0656
(0.081) (0.082)
Native Speaker 0.3770∗∗ -0.2448
(0.147) (0.162)
N 168 168 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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8.2 Figures
(a) Control (b) Treatment
Figure 1: The distribution of level-k strategies
(a) Contribution belief (b) Own Contribution
Figure 2: Average contribution and beliefs about partner’s contribution in PGG
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Figure 3: Most frequently used words by subjects during chat
(a) Highly Extraverted (b) Less Extraverted
(c) Highly Neurotic (d) Less Neurotic
Figure 4: Most frequently used words by subjects believed to have different personalities
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Appendix
A Additional Tables and Figures
A.1 Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for independent variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Own Extraversion 3.372 0.814 1.25 5 338
Own Neuroticism 2.935 0.811 1 5 338
Extraversion Belief 3.499 0.827 1 5 338
Neuroticism Belief 2.818 0.865 1 5 338
Own IQ 18.604 4.464 4 28 338
IQ Belief 18.213 4.825 1 30 338
Eyes Test Score 27.817 3.759 11 35 338
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 21.154 3.622 17 42 338
Risk Aversion 4.317 0.767 1.533 6 338
Female 0.615 0.487 0 1 338
Non-native English speaker 0.349 0.477 0 1 338
A.1
A.2 11-20 money request game
Table A.3: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and predicted on the
probability of choosing the best response - Logit Model
Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2) Pr(Level=2)
DiffExtraversion -0.0480 -0.0470 0.0833∗∗∗ 0.0913∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.028)
DiffNeuroticism -0.0020 -0.0163 -0.0469 -0.0468
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Own IQ 0.0644∗ 0.0546
(0.038) (0.038)
IQ Belief -0.0433 -0.0070
(0.028) (0.038)
Eyes Test Score 0.0497 0.0402
(0.039) (0.034)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 170 170 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
A.2
Table A.4: Impact of (absolute) difference between own personality and predicted on
probability of best responding - Linear Probability Model
Level
Belief
(1) (2) (3)
DiffExtraversion × Treatment 0.1333∗∗∗ 0.1444∗∗∗ 0.1068∗
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056)
DiffNeuroticism × Treatment -0.0431 -0.0285 -0.0250
(0.043) (0.047) (0.047)
Treatment 0.0581 0.1340 0.0592
(0.042) (0.281) (0.291)
DiffExtraversion -0.0441 -0.0437 -0.0175
(0.036) (0.035) (0.040)
DiffNeuroticism -0.0009 -0.0146 -0.0232
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
Own Extraversion × Treatment 0.0232 -0.0867
(0.059) (0.113)
Own Extraversion -0.0077 0.0233
(0.030) (0.081)
Own IQ × Treatment -0.0091 -0.0088
(0.053) (0.055)
IQ Belief × Treatment 0.0328 0.0281
(0.047) (0.047)
Eyes Test Score × Treatment -0.0063 -0.0160
(0.052) (0.052)
Own IQ 0.0591 0.0595
(0.036) (0.037)
IQ Belief -0.0379 -0.0332
(0.028) (0.027)
Eyes Test Score 0.0422 0.0456
(0.041) (0.041)
Extraversion × Extraversion Quartile No No Yes
Controls No Yes Yes
N 338 338 338
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
A.3
A.3 Public Goods Game
(a) Control (b) Treatment
Figure A.1: Average contribution in PGG. Order 1 is when PGG is played first. On
average players contribute more in the Treatment group when PGG is played first. There
is no difference for control group subjects.
Table A.5: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality on beliefs about partner’s con-
tribution and own contribution in Public Goods Game
Control
Order 1
Treatment
Order 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contribution
Belief
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Own
Contribution
ExtraversionBelief 0.0441 0.0590 0.0977 0.1070 0.2016∗ 0.1929∗ 0.1933∗∗ 0.1712∗
(0.605) (0.487) (0.280) (0.305) (0.057) (0.066) (0.036) (0.050)
NeurotcisimBelief 0.0445 0.0462 -0.0210 -0.0279 0.1793 0.1647 0.1611 0.1719
(0.628) (0.677) (0.814) (0.787) (0.116) (0.140) (0.180) (0.134)
Own IQ -0.0670 -0.0115 0.1277 0.1800∗
(0.533) (0.896) (0.159) (0.084)
IQ Belief 0.1340 0.1026 0.0973 0.2536∗∗
(0.178) (0.348) (0.322) (0.013)
Eyes Test Score -0.0261 0.0225 0.1219 0.1726
(0.791) (0.865) (0.191) (0.153)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 110 110 110 110 106 106 106 106
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
A.4
Table A.6: Impact of beliefs about partner’s personality and own personality on beliefs
about partner’s contribution and own contribution in Public Goods Game - Order 2
Control
OLS
Control
IV
Treatment
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
Contribution
Belief
Own
Contribution
ExtraversionBelief -0.0367 -0.2409∗ 0.5870 1.6483 0.1306 1.3025
(0.151) (0.124) (1.136) (2.189) (1.093) (2.040)
OwnExtraversion 0.1641 0.0325 0.1888 0.1073 0.1248 -0.1196
(0.162) (0.162) (0.156) (0.270) (0.194) (0.329)
Own IQ 0.1385 0.0439 0.0155 -0.3285 -0.0348 -0.0500
(0.205) (0.163) (0.281) (0.528) (0.121) (0.225)
IQ Belief 0.1808 0.0172 0.2185 0.1313 -0.0663 -0.1695
(0.161) (0.134) (0.190) (0.260) (0.143) (0.211)
Eyes Test Score -0.2721 0.2371 -0.2023 0.4486 0.2621 0.0816
(0.177) (0.167) (0.202) (0.374) (0.160) (0.337)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 60 60 60 60 62 62
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B Experimental Instructions
This following part is read out by the experimenter.
Thank you everyone for coming to our experiment today. Before we begin, please check
that the number on the card handed to you matches with the number on the cubicle that
you are seated in.
During the whole experiment, please do not speak with each other. If you do not
understand something, please ask the experimenter by raising your hand. We will come
to you and answer your question individually. Please also refrain from using your mobile
phones during the experiment.
Also bear in mind that you may have to wait a few moments during the experiment,
as we want everyone to finish at the same time. You will see the message ‘Please wait
until the experiment continues’ on your screen when this is applicable.
Before we begin, I would just like to say, that your participation is very crucial for our
research and we truly appreciate all of you being here. Thank you. We will now begin
the experiment.
A.5
B.1 General Instructions
In the laboratory experiment you are taking part in, you can - depending on your decisions
and the decisions of your fellow players- earn money in addition to the show-up fee of
£4. It is, therefore, of importance that you read these instructions carefully. Today’s
experiment consists of the following: In the first section, you will be asked to answer a
few questions and solve some puzzles. In the second section, you will be asked to make
decisions in a few tasks. Lastly, there will be some questions for you to answer. Please
note that the experiment will not involve any deception and your answers today will
remain strictly anonymous. The generated anonymous data will only be used for the
purpose of our study. Therefore, we request you to answer to the best of your ability as
it is integral to our research. The outcomes from each task will be disclosed at the end
of the experiment. Detailed instructions for each part will follow. We will now begin the
experiment.
a Questionnaire: Personality (44 questions)
You will be asked to answer some questions about yourself. Your payment will not
be affected by this. Just to remind you, your answers will remain anonymous so
please answer as truthfully as possible as this is critically important for our research.
You will see a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For
example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?
Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you
agree or disagree with that statement. I see myself as someone who. . .
START BFI QUESTIONNAIRE
b PUZZLES: Raven Test (30 items)
You will be asked to solve some puzzles, a pattern game. On the screen, you will
see a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures missing. You need to choose
a picture from the choices given below to complete the pattern. You will have 30
seconds to complete each set of pictures. The first picture you will see will be an
example, no input is required. You will then be asked to solve a total of 30 such
puzzles. 2 of these 30 puzzles will randomly be selected. For each correct answer,
from the random 2, you will receive £1. Please make sure to click ‘submit answer’,
as otherwise your answer will not be recorded, and you might lose money.
START RAVEN TEST
Out of the 30 puzzles you just saw, how many puzzles do you think you correctly
solved? If your answer to this question is correct, then you will win an additional
£1.
A.6
Now subjects will be allocated to one of 2 treatment groups
B.2 Control Group
Placebo Task 1: (4 minutes)4
Can you please indicate the title and summarize the story of the last movie you have
seen? Please be as specific as possible and include as many details as possible. Please use
a minimum of 250 characters. You will have 4 minutes to write the summary.
Please write the summary in the box provided on the next screen.
(next screen) Please make sure to click ’Submit’ after you are done, as otherwise your
answer will not be recorded.
Beliefs
You have been randomly and anonymously matched with another person in this room
who is participating in the experiment. Please answer a few questions about the other
player to the best of your ability, before you proceed with the tasks.
1. You will see a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to the other
player. For example, do you agree that the other player is someone who likes to
spend time with others? Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement regarding the other
player.
You will see 11 statements about the other player.
1 out of these 11 statements will be randomly chosen and if your answer matches
that of the other player, then you will win an additional £1.
START PERSONALITY PREDICTION QUESTIONNAIRE
2. Recall the visual puzzle task from earlier in the experiment. On the screen, you
saw a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures missing. You had to choose a
picture from the choices given below to complete the pattern. You had 30 seconds
to complete each set of pictures. You were asked to solve a total of 30 such puzzles.
How many puzzles do you think the other player, with whom you have been matched,
correctly solved? Please indicate a (whole) number between 0 and 30.
If your answer to this question is correct, then you will win an additional of £1.
4This task has been adapted from the Placebo Task used in Bursztyn, Ferman, Fiorin, Kanz, and Rao
(2017).
A.7
B.3 Tasks
You will now take part in a few decision-making tasks with the player with whom you
have already been matched. Note that you will be participating in all tasks with the same
player. Your payoff from these tasks will be calculated in Experimental Pounds (EP). The
exchange rate between £ and EP is 1:5, i.e. 5 EP = £1. The outcomes from each task will
be disclosed at the end of the experiment. You will receive payment based on your results
from one of the tasks randomly selected from the tasks in this part of the experiment.
Please note that each task is equally likely to be chosen for payment.
Task 1: PGG
You will now participate in a task with the player with whom you have been matched.
You have 20 EP and the other player has 20 EP as well. Your task in the game, and
also the other player’s task, is to decide how much to contribute to a joint project. You
can choose to contribute any amount between 0 and 20 EP (only integer numbers). Your
earnings from the project is the total contribution to the project, made by you and the
other player, multiplied by a factor of 3/4. Your payoff from this task will be your earnings
from the project, plus the amount you did not contribute. Thus, your final payoffs (in
EP) will be given by:
Your payoff = (20– your contribution)+3/4(your contribution + the other player’s
contribution)
Other player’s payoff = (20– the other player’s contribution)+3/4(your contribution
+ the other player’s contribution)
If for example, you contribute 20 EP to the project and the other player contributes
20 EP then, Your payoff will be: 20–20 + 3/4(20 + 20) = 30 The other player’s payoff will
be: 20–20 + 3/4(20 + 20) = 30
If for example, you contribute 0 EP to the project and the other player contributes 20
EP then, Your payoff will be: 20–0 + 3/4(0 + 20) = 35 The other player’s payoff will be:
20–20 + 3/4(0 + 20) = 15
If you have a question, please raise your hand. If you have read the instructions and
do not have any questions, please click ‘OK’ to proceed to a practice quiz. The quiz is
to make sure that you understand the task and your answers will not affect your payoffs
from the experiment.
Suppose you choose to contribute 20 EP and the other player chooses to contribute 0
EP. Your payoff will be: The other player’s payoff will be:
Suppose you choose to contribute 10 EP and the other player chooses to contribute
14 EP. Your payoff will be: The other player’s payoff will be:
A.8
You have correctly answered the practice quiz. Click ‘Continue’ to proceed with the
task.
How much money do you think the other player will contribute? Please indicate a
number (an integer) between 0 and 20.
If your answer to this question matches that of the other player, then you will win
an additional £1. How much would you like to contribute? Please choose a number (an
integer) between 0 and 20.
Task 2: 11-20 money request game
You will now participate in a different task with the same player.
You and the other player are playing a game in which each player requests an amount
of money. The amount must be (an integer) between 11 and 20 Experimental Pounds.
Each player will receive the amount he or she requests. A player will receive an additional
amount of 20 Experimental Pounds if he or she asks for exactly one Experimental Pound
less than the other player.
If for example, you request 19 EP and the other player requests 20 EP then, Your
payoff will be: 19 + 20 = 39
The other player’s payoff will be: 20
If for example, you request 17 EP and the other player requests 16 EP then, Your
payoff will be: 17
The other player’s payoff will be: 16 + 20 = 36
If you have a question, please raise your hand.
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please click ‘OK’ to
proceed to a practice quiz. The quiz is to make sure that you understand the task and
your answers will not affect your payoffs from the experiment.
Suppose you choose to request 13 EP and the other player chooses to request 14 EP.
Your payoff will be: The other player’s payoff will be:
Suppose you choose to request 15 EP and the other player chooses to request 18 EP.
Your payoff will be: The other player’s payoff will be:
You have correctly answered the practice quiz. Click ‘Continue’ to proceed with the
task.
How much money do you think the other player will request? Please indicate a number
(an integer) between 11 and 20.
If your answer to this question matches that of the other player, then you will win an
additional £1.
What amount of money would you request? Please choose a number (an integer)
between 11 and 20.
A.9
B.4 Treatment Group
Chat Instructions
You have been randomly and anonymously matched with another person in this room
who is participating in the experiment.
Before you proceed with the tasks, you are allowed to chat with the other player for 4
minutes. You can type in the box provided at the bottom of the screen and press Enter
on your keyboard to send your messages.
Your message should not contain any personal information such as your name or your
computer ID. The purpose is to preserve anonymity throughout the experiment. You are
allowed to chat freely in English and in a non-abusive manner.
Beliefs
Now that you have chatted with the other player please answer a few questions about
the other player, before you proceed with the tasks.
1. You will see a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to the other
player. For example, do you agree that the other player is someone who likes to
spend time with others? Please pick an option next to each statement to indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement regarding the other
player. You will see 11 statements about the other player.
1 out of these 11 statements will be randomly chosen and if your answer matches
that of the other player, then you will win an additional £1.
START PERSONALITY PREDICTION QUESTIONNAIRE
2. Recall the visual puzzle task from earlier in the experiment. On the screen, you
saw a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures missing. You had to choose a
picture from the choices given below to complete the pattern. You had 30 seconds
to complete each set of pictures. You were asked to solve a total of 30 such puzzles.
How many puzzles do you think the other player, with whom you chatted, correctly
solved? Please indicate a (whole) number between 0 and 30. If your answer to this
question is correct, then you will win an additional £1.
B.5 Tasks
You will now take part in a few decision-making tasks with the player you chatted with.
Note that you will be participating in all tasks with the same player. Your payoff from
these tasks will be calculated in Experimental Pounds (EP). The exchange rate between
£ and EP is 1:5, i.e. 5 EP = £1.
A.10
The outcomes from each task will be disclosed at the end of the experiment. You will
receive payment based on your results from one of the tasks randomly selected from the
tasks in this part of the experiment. Please note that each task is equally likely to be
chosen for payment.
Task 1: PGG
You will now participate in a task with the player you chatted with. You have 20 EP and
the other player has 20 EP as well. Your task in the game, and also the other player’s
task, is to decide how much to contribute to a joint project. You can choose to contribute
any amount between 0 and 20 EP (only integer numbers). Your earnings from the project
is the total contribution to the project, made by you and the other player, multiplied by
a factor of 3⁄4. Your payoff from this task will be your earnings from the project, plus the
amount you did not contribute. Thus, your final payoffs (in EP) will be given by:
Your payoff = (20– your contribution)+3/4(your contribution + the other player’s
contribution)
Other player’s payoff = (20– the other player’s contribution)+3/4(your contribution +
the other player’s contribution)
Examples and quiz related to the game, then strategy belief and task choice
Task 2: 11-20 money request game
You will now participate in a different task with the same player.
You and the other player are playing a game in which each player requests an amount
of money. The amount must be (an integer) between 11 and 20 Experimental Pounds.
Each player will receive the amount he or she requests. A player will receive an additional
amount of 20 Experimental Pounds if he or she asks for exactly one Experimental Pound
less than the other player.
Examples and quiz related to the game, then strategy belief and task choice
FOR BOTH CONTROL AND TREATMENT:
B.6 Eyes Test (36 questions)
In this section, you will be asked to look at 36 pictures of different pairs of eyes.
For each set of eyes, choose the word which best describes what the person in the
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but
please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before
making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the
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task as quickly as possible, but you will not be timed. If you do not know what a word
means you can read the meaning of the word provided at the bottom of the screen.
2 of these 36 questions you answer will randomly be selected. For each correct answer,
from the random 2, you will receive £1.
You will first see a practice question with four options. The correct option will be
highlighted. After that you may proceed to the questions.
Which word best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling?
START EYES TEST
B.7 Questionnaire
Thank you. Now, in the final section, you will be asked to answer some questions about
yourself.
a Risk Please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described activity
or behaviour if you were to find yourself in that situation
START DOSPERT
b Personal information
1. How old are you? (in years)
2. What is your year of study? (1, 2, 3, Post-graduate Other)
3. What is your gender? (M, F, Other, Prefer not to say)
4. What is your nationality?
5. Is English your Native language? (Yes, No)
6. What is your current degree course?
7. Would you consider your degree course mostly: (quantitative, qualitative)
8. Have you ever taken any game theory modules/courses? (Yes, No)
9. How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life in general? (1-7 scale from
completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied)
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Profit display screen
1. Number of correct answers from the visual puzzles task (out of 30):
2. Your payoff (in EP) from the first decision-making task:
3. Your payoff (in EP) from the second decision-making task:
4. Number of correct answers from the eyes task (out of 36):
5. Additional amount earned (in £):
6. Total earnings (in £):
Thank you for completing the experiment successfully. Please queue at the marked line
once you are done, show the number card and collect your payment in cash.
C Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb
(2001))
A few examples of the Eyes Test are provided below.
(a) (b)
Figure A.2: Adult Eyes Test
D Risk Preferences (Blais and Weber (2006))
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage
in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation. Provide
a rating from 1 to 7 where 1 is Extremely Unlikely and 7 is Extremely Likely.
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.
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2. Going camping in the wilderness.
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund.
5. Drinking heavily at a social function.
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return.
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue.
8. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game.
9. Having an affair with a married man/woman.
10. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability.
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
13. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.
14. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event .
15. Engaging in unprotected sex.
16. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else.
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.
19. Taking a skydiving class.
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.
21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more prestigious one.
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work.
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen.
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.
25. Piloting a small plane.
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.
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27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family.
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties.
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand.
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains £200.
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